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Covenant Violations, Loan Contracting, 
and Default Risk of Bank Borrowers 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Are borrowers rewarded for repaying their loans? This paper investigates the consequences of 
covenant violations on subsequent loans to the same borrower using a hand-collected sample of 
US syndicated loans during the 1996 to 2010 period. We find that covenant violations have 
substantial negative effects for borrowers in subsequent loans. Our results show that the loan 
spread increases by 22 basis points in the loan following the violation. We also find that the new 
contract includes more financial covenants which are also more restrictive. Switching banks after 
a violation does not reduce these effects and even leads to a further increase in loan spreads. We 
also provide empirical evidence that borrowers who have violated covenants in the previous 
contract are significantly more likely to violate covenants again in the next loan. Moreover, they 
violate earlier compared to borrowers who have not violated covenants before. Most importantly, 
these borrowers also exhibit a substantially higher likelihood to default, particularly in the first 
100 days after a violation. Our results suggest that there is an important role for covenants in 
monitoring borrowers and that covenant violations provide an early warning signal for a severe 
deterioration of borrower credit quality. 
 
Keywords: Covenant Violation, Financial Default, Syndicated Loans. 
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1. Introduction 
Are borrowers rewarded for repaying their loans? We analyze this question for a sample 
of U.S. firms who are recurring borrowers in loan markets and focus on the contract design of 
newly issued loans. More specifically, we analyze violations of covenants and their effects on 
subsequent loans. Covenants are an integral part of private credit agreements. Empirical studies, 
however, have only recently started to examine covenants particularly with respect to contract 
renegotiations, corporate investments and debt structure. We contribute to this literature studying 
the implications of covenant violations for new loans from the same borrowers. How are these 
contracts designed? Do borrowers have to pay higher spreads after violations? Are lenders 
tougher on borrowers increasing the number of covenants and making contracts stricter? How is 
borrower performance affected? Are borrowers repeatedly violating covenants? And, are 
borrowers also more likely to default if they have previously violated covenants? 
At the core of our analysis is a novel and hand collected dataset of loans and covenants 
which we construct from original loan contracts from the borrowers‟ SEC filings. Our sample 
comprises 3,183 loans over the 1996 to 2010 period after applying a large number of filters and 
after matching these contracts to LPC Dealscan and borrowers to the merged CRSP/Compustat 
database. We collect more than 80 different covenant types and definitions from these contracts 
and classify them into 17 groups of financial covenants. We also know step-up and step-down 
provisions for each covenant. We use all information available to us from these contracts to 
calculate covenant violations on a quarterly basis. 
 We start analyzing loan spreads and the number of covenants for loans of recurring 
borrowers. We find that borrowers are rewarded for not violating covenants paying significantly 
lower spreads. Lenders also reduce the number of covenants in subsequent loan contracts. 
Violations, on the other hand, increase loan spreads as well as the number of covenants. 
Interestingly, we find that negative effects attenuate if borrowers repeatedly borrow. Using 
Bradley and Roberts (2004) covenant index, we also find that contracts become stricter after 
violations. Moreover, we find that borrowers who violated covenants in the previous contract are 
about 30% more likely to violate again in the current loan, and they also violate sooner than other 
borrowers. Larger firms as well as investment grade rated firms are less likely to violate while 
highly leveraged firms as well as non-investment grade rated firms are more likely to violate 
covenants. 
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Overall, we find that lenders substantially increase the number and intensity of covenants 
after violations which is consistent with the interpretation that covenant violations are used as an 
early warning signal for deteriorating borrower creditworthiness and that lenders increase 
monitoring efforts making loan contracts stricter. 
Starting in 1987, we have a complete history of borrower and lender pairs in this market, 
and we use this information to classify borrowers into whether or not they switch lenders after 
violations.  Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that borrowers hardly switch lenders after covenant 
violations. We study the effect of switching on loan contract terms and find that switching (not 
conditioning on previous violations) increases loan spreads but has hardly any effect on the 
number or intensity of covenants. Neither do we find an effect on the propensity to violate. 
However, borrowers who violate are doing this earlier than borrowers who have not switched 
lenders. 
 We do not find that there is an additional mark-up on loan spreads for borrowers who 
switch after violations. Segregating our sample into opaque and transparent firms (based on 
borrower age, size and rating status) does not reveal a spread increase for those who have 
switched and violated either. Interestingly, we find that borrowers who switch after violations are 
less likely to violate repeatedly compared to those who do not switch. A possible interpretation is 
that new lenders invest more time and effort in screening and monitoring these borrowers. 
In the last part of the paper, we ask given that covenant violations provide an early 
warning signal with respect to borrower health, whether this is also reflected in higher default 
rates of borrowers who violate. We augment our dataset with Chapter 11 filings from the UCLA-
LoPucki bankruptcy database to examine this question using three different approaches: First, we 
investigate the impact of a covenant violation in the previous loan contract on the probability to 
default. Second, we construct a covenant violation dummy equal to 1 if the firm violates a 
covenant between 1,080 to 180 days before the default date. Third, instead of focusing on the last 
contract before default, we use the entire universe of loan contracts of our sample borrowers 
assess the effects of covenant violations in any of the borrower‟s previous loans (not necessarily 
the last one). This allows us to assess whether violations in the past still have some predictive 
power. Overall, we find that covenant violations substantially increase the likelihood of future 
default. However, the likelihood of default decreases substantially the more time has passed after 
the last covenant violation. The conditional probability of default (PD) is 36% on the first day 
after the covenant violation and it continues to be substantially higher compared to the 
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unconditional PD for the first 100 days after covenant violation. Taken together, our results 
suggest that there is an important role for covenants in monitoring borrowers and that covenant 
violations provide an early warning signal for a severe deterioration of borrower credit quality. 
Our paper adds to the literature studying the effects of covenants and covenant violations. 
Nini et al. (2010) find a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures after a violation. 
Furthermore, borrowers decrease their leverage and CEO turnover increases. Chava and Roberts 
(2008) discover a sharp decline in investment spending, which is particularly pronounced if 
information problems are more severe. Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Demiroglu and James (2010) 
show that tighter covenants decrease investment spending and net debt issuances. The importance 
of covenant violations is further emphasized by Dyreng (2009). He highlights that borrowers 
engage in earnings management in order to prevent covenant violations. None of these papers 
however, studies the role of covenant violations as early warning indicator and monitoring 
instrument. Moreover, we study violations not only in the cross-section of borrowers but also in 
the time series using a history of hand-collected loans for borrowers who recurrently borrow in 
the loan market. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes how we construct the dataset 
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3 shows the results relating contract violations to 
the design of subsequent loans and the performance of borrowers which respect to future 
violations and corporate default. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1 Data 
To investigate the effect of covenant violations on subsequent loans, we construct a new 
data set collecting original loan contracts directly from the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) filings of public firms using EDGAR (Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval). 
Material loan contracts have to be reported as required by the SEC and can be found as an exhibit 
to a 10-K, 10-Q or 8-K report. We start with the set of private credit agreements provided by 
Greg Nini, David Smith and Amir Sufi who collected these contracts for the 1996 to 2005 period 
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and extend this set of contracts for 5 more years until the end of 2010.
1
 Their sample includes 
3,720 contracts amended in our data set with 1,276 additional loans. 
We start with the universe of 4,996 private credit agreements for the 1996 to 2010 period 
available from Dealscan. We exclude all observations where we cannot identify a contract in 
EDGAR as well as loans specified as amendments in Dealscan or in the loan contract following 
Roberts (2010). In other words, all contracts are new loans. 96% of these loans can be matched to 
the contracts from EDGAR. Although Dealscan already provides some information on negative 
and financial covenants which is also more complete particularly starting in 2000, we still find 
that several covenants are missing from our contracts. Furthermore, the definition of seemingly 
similar covenants differs substantially between contracts and is aggregated in Dealscan without 
further information. Additionally, only one threshold for financial covenants is recorded in the 
database, but thresholds frequently change.
2
  We therefore manually build a novel set of 
covenants in private credit agreements collecting all covenants from 3,813 contracts. We do not 
use any text-search program to avoid possible misspecification of the algorithm.  
 
Private loan agreements typically include both negative and financial covenants.
3
 
Negative covenants prevent the borrower from certain actions such as excessive investments, 
distribution of too high dividends, sale of assets, changes in company control, entering sale-and-
lease-back transactions, or a change in business activities. Financial covenants are often termed 
“performance hurdles” (Roberts and Sufi, 2008) or “trip wires” (Dichev and Skinner, 2001) due 
to their ability to shift control rights. Examples of financial covenants are accounting-based 
amounts and ratios which can be found in the reporting data of the company (e.g. Taylor and 
Sansone, 2007; Nini et al., 2008). There exist maintenance and incurrence covenants. The former 
imply that the borrower has to meet certain criteria on a regular basis where the latter refer to a 
predetermined event, such as the issuance of new debt or the acquisition of another company.  
We record the threshold for each quarter from origination to final maturity of each loan 
because it changes several times in many loans. These step-down or step-up provisions cannot be 
found in Dealscan. Furthermore, we find about 80 different definitions of covenants and classify 
                                                          
1
 Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) and Roberts and Sufi (2009). 
2
 Appendix I shows an example of a financial covenant section in a loan contract. 
3
 We do not include affirmative covenants such as punctual payment of interest and principal, delivery of financial 
statements, property and equipment maintenance, compliance to accounting standards, or paying insurance and taxes, 
as these are often not observable following, for example, Bradley and Roberts (2004) and Demiroglu and James 
(2010). 
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them into 17 main covenant types.
 4
 We describe them in Table I. However, we use the 
definitions of all 80 covenants to identify covenant violations using the corresponding 
information from the company‟s financial statements.  
 
To construct our data set, we merge the contracts from EDGAR with several other data 
sources. We obtain loan contract information from Dealscan including loan spread (AISD), 
maturity, loan amounts and lender identity. To identify repeated borrowing from the same lender 
as well as switching between lenders, we construct the merger history for each lender in Dealscan 
using information obtained from the FDIC and the National Information Center (NIC). Using 
Robert‟s Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database (Chava et a.. (2008)), we collect quarterly 
financial statement information from Compustat and merge it to each loan contract. We exclude 
all loans for which this information is not available. Finally, we obtain borrower default 
information via the Chapter 11 filings in the UCLA-LoPucki bankruptcy research database. All 
variables are described in Table I. The final dataset includes 3,813 loans with 5,411 loan 
facilities. 
 
[Table I] 
 
2.2 Covenants and covenant violations 
Using the covenants collected from the SEC filings, we construct several proxies as to the 
strictness of contracts and covenant violations. We define the Number of Financial Covenants as 
the sum over the indicator variables representing the 17 main covenant types shown in Table I. A 
contract with more covenants is more restrictive compared to a contract with fewer covenants.  
Our Covenant Intensity Index reflects the tightness of the covenants following Bradley 
and Roberts (2004). It includes not only financial but also negative covenants. The index ranges 
from zero to six with high values indicating intense covenants. It is constructed summing the 
indicator variables for dividend restriction, equity sweep, asset sweep, debt sweep, securitization, 
and a binary variable that is one if the contract includes two or more financial covenants.  
                                                          
4
 The substantially larger number of covenants can be explained by the variety of definitions of the respective 
variables. Consider for example a debt to capitalization covenant. Debt can be senior, long term or defined as the 
total value. Capitalization can refer to net worth plus equity or tangible net worth plus equity. 
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The borrower has to comply with most financial covenants on a quarterly basis (Roberts 
and Sufi, 2008). A covenant is violated if the corresponding accounting value is above or below 
its respective threshold. 
Days to Covenant Violation is measured as the difference between inception of the 
contract until the end of the quarter during which a financial covenant is violated for the first 
time.  
 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.1 Loan Contracts and Borrower Characteristics 
The final data set consists of 5,411 facilities (3,813 loans) over the 1996 to 2010 period. 
Table II provides detailed summary statistics on loan and borrower characteristics. All data are 
measured in real terms with 2000 as the base year. 
 
[Table II] 
 
The average loan facility is $298 million with an All-In-Spread-Drawn (AISD) of 183 
basis points (bps) and 2.55 financial covenants. The covenant intensity index is derived following 
Bradley and Roberts (2004) and loans contain, on average, 4.55 out of 6 possible restrictions. 
55% of the loans are violated and these violations occur on average 14 months (427 days) after 
the loan origination date. Furthermore, we find an average borrower default rate of 2.5%. 
Borrowers switch banks in 35.1% of all cases and violate a financial covenant in more than half 
(57.2%) of all of their previous loan contracts. 
The average borrower size is $3,291 million with a profitability of 16%, a current ratio of 
1.84, a leverage ratio of 0.32, an interest coverage ratio of 15.44, and a market-to-book ratio of 
1.68. More than one half of the loans are rated and 24.1% are classified as investment and 34.5% 
as non-investment grade. 
 
2.3.2 Covenant Violations 
To get a better understanding of how spreads and covenant restrictions evolve as 
borrowers repeatedly borrow in the loan market, we graphically explore average loan spreads and 
number of covenants in loan contracts as a function of previous covenant violations when 
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borrowers obtain a loan for the second, third, and fourth time. Figure 1 shows how loan spreads 
develop for a borrower who obtains loans from the same lender. The number of observations is 
provided in parentheses.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
A first time borrower pays on average 193 bps above LIBOR which decreases to 77 bps in 
the fourth contract conditional on never having violated a covenant. Borrowers also become less 
opaque as they frequently borrow in the loan market. At the same time, always violating a 
covenant in the first three loans increases loan spreads to 213bps in the fourth loan. A violation in 
the first loan increases loan spreads to 210bps, not violating a covenant in the second loan 
reduces spreads to 129bps in the third loan. Interestingly, a borrower who violates a covenant in 
the second but not the first loan pays, on average, 150bps if she borrows for the third time. In 
other words, the effect of violations on spreads dissipates over time.  Overall, Figure 1 shows that 
covenant violations results in higher spreads for borrowers in subsequent loans. 
 A similar pattern is observable with respect to the number of financial covenants in new 
loan contracts.  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Figure 2 shows how the average number of the financial covenants develops over time as 
borrowers frequently return to the loan market. Not violating covenants reduces the number of 
covenants in subsequent loans, whereas the number of covenants increases following a covenant 
violation in the previous contract. Again, we observe that the effect of covenants violations is 
more pronounced in the contract following the violation. 
In Table III, we segregate the entire sample based on whether or not the borrower violated 
a covenant in the previous contract.  
 
[Table III] 
 
Columns A and B show mean and median characteristics for borrowers who did not (did) 
violate a covenant in the previous contract. The last column reports the parametric t-statistic 
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(nonparametric z-statistic) of the difference in means (medians) test. Table III shows that the 
differences between both groups substantial. On average, borrowers have to pay a higher spread 
of 98 bps, accept 0.6 more financial covenants which are in addition significantly more 
restrictive. On the other hand, borrowers who violate a covenant in the previous loan contract 
again violate contract terms in 70% of all loans, within a shorter time period from to the contract 
start date and furthermore are significantly more likely to default. 
Table III also shows that borrowers who violated covenants are more likely to switch 
lenders in the next loan. If lenders reward borrowers for switching, having violated covenants 
might have fewer consequences as to lower spreads or less strict covenants. We investigate the 
effects of switching lenders on loan contract terms especially after having violated a covenant in 
our multivariate analysis. We also find that loan amounts decrease after a covenant violation. 
Moreover, the percentage of secured loans almost doubles.  Borrowers who violate covenants are 
also smaller, higher leveraged with lower interest coverage and market-to-book ratio and they are 
also lower rated. 
Overall, the univariate results are consistent with the interpretation that covenant 
violations provide an early warning signal for deteriorating borrower performance and that 
covenants are used by banks to monitor borrowers. 
 
 
2.3.3 Repeated Borrowing 
Table IV tabulates various contract characteristics (spread, covenant measures and 
defaults) grouped by the number of loans of the same borrower.  
 
[Table IV] 
 
Panel A of Table IV focuses on loans of borrowers from the same lender. That is, we 
observe how contract characteristics develop over a bank-borrower relationship. Loan spreads are 
decreasing which is consistent with the literature (for example, Bharath et al. (2011)), we also 
observe a lower number of covenants and lower default rates as the relationship evolves 
consistent with the monitoring role of relationship lenders. Interestingly, the covenant intensity is 
increasing. One possible interpretation is that an increase in covenant intensity associated with 
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covenant violations (note that both violation and non-violations are included) is dominating 
possible positive relationship effects. 
Panel B of Table IV shows the results also grouped by the number of loans from the same 
borrower but not conditional on borrowing from the same lender. In other words, we observe 
both relationship borrowers as well as firms that switch lenders. Interestingly, we do not find 
lower loan spreads for borrowers who borrow repeatedly in the loan market. We observe fewer 
covenants and a lower likelihood to violate covenants. However, covenant intensity is increasing 
as well as the likelihood to default.  
Overall, we find evidence consistent with relationship benefits with regard to lower loan 
spreads and fewer covenants. Repeated borrowing alone does not reduce loan spreads. 
 
 
 
3. Results 
 
In this section, we analyze the effect of a covenant violation on contract terms in 
subsequent loans. In all tests, we control for loan characteristics including maturity (months), a 
dummy variable when the loan is secured, and the natural logarithm of the facility size. We also 
include borrower characteristics such as profitability, current ratio, leverage, coverage, market to 
book ratio, total assets, and borrower credit rating. Furthermore, we account for time (calendar 
year), industry (one-digit SIC industry classification), loan type, and loan purpose fixed effects as 
well as clustering of error terms at the firm level and potential heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.1 Covenant violations and loan contract terms 
To analyze the effect of covenant violations on the design of subsequent loan contracts, 
we use a regression framework of the following form: 
 
LCT = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * LoanCharacteristics  
+ d * BorrowerCharacteristics + e * OtherControls + ε 
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LCT („Loan Contract Terms‟) refers to the different dependent variables. There are: 
AISD, Number of Covenants, Covenant Intensity, Contract Violation and Days to Contract 
Violation. The results are reported in Table V. 
 
[Table V] 
 
Table V reports five models, one for each dependent variable. It also shows the regression 
methodology used in each regression. Column 1 of Table V reports the results of an OLS 
regression relating AISD to previous covenant violations and other control variables (loan 
characteristics, borrower characteristics, and rating). We find that previous covenant violations 
increase loan spreads on subsequent loans by 22 bps which is significant at the 1% level and 
economically meaningful. Most of the other control variables are also highly significant and carry 
the expected signs. For example, larger loans have lower spreads, secured loans and highly 
leveraged loans carry larger spreads. All variables are defined in Table I. Standard errors are 
clustered at the borrower level. Columns 2 and 3 of Table V report the results of an ordered logit 
regression relating the number of covenants and covenant intensity to covenant violations and our 
control variables. We find that previous violations increase the number of covenants. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Covenant intensity is also increasing, the coefficient, 
however, is only weakly significant. The number of observations also drops to 848 in Column 3 
because we need to rely on data reported by Dealscan in order to calculate the index in a similar 
fashion as in Bradley and Roberts (2004), Demiroglu and James (2010) and Bharath et al. (2011). 
Information about asset sweep, equity sweep or secured status is missing in many cases. In 
Column 4 we analyze the effect of previous covenant violations on the likelihood to violate in the 
subsequent loan and find a positive effect. Having violated a covenant in the previous contract 
increases the likelihood to violate by 30 %. The control variable are as expected, larger and 
investment grade rated firms are less likely to violate, whereas firms with higher leverage and 
larger loan sizes (that is, ceteris paribus more debt and higher interest expense) are more likely to 
violate. Column 5 then analyzes the time period until a new violation occurs in a subsample of 
loans to borrowers that all violate at least 1 covenant. We find that previous covenant violations 
significantly reduce the time until the next violation occurs.  
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3.2 Switching and loan contract terms 
Next, we analyze the effect of switching between banks on contract terms. If lenders 
reward borrowers for switching, having violated covenants might have fewer consequences as to 
lower spreads or less strict covenants. 
 
LCT = a + b * Switch+ c * LoanCharacteristics + d * BorrowerCharacteristics  
               + e * OtherControls + ε 
 
We follow Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and define Switch as an indicator variable equal 
to 1 when the borrower did not have a lending relationship with the lead arranger in a new 
contract over at least 1 year.
5
 The various loan contract terms discussed above are our dependent 
variables in models 1 to 5. The results are reported in Table VI. 
 
[Table VI] 
 
Column 1 of Table VI reports an increase in loan spreads of 12bps when firms switch 
banks. On the other hand, the number of financial covenants decreases (Column 2) although the 
coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. Switching does not have an effect on the 
restrictiveness of covenants (Column 3) and does not affect the likelihood to violate covenants in 
subsequent contracts. However, if borrowers violate, firms that switch violate about 2 months (65 
days) earlier compared to other firms. 
 
 
3.3 Covenant violations, switching and loan contract terms  
3.3.1 Switching, covenant violations and loan spreads 
Our earlier results show that covenant violations in the previous loan contract leads to a 
higher spread in the subsequent loan. Switching banks has a similar effect. We next ask whether 
                                                          
5
 This definition implicitly assumes that private information banks learn about borrowers is not durable and 
dissipates after 1 year. We use other definitions for Switch in robustness tests and find similar results. 
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borrowers who have violated a covenant switch banks to avoid a markup both in pricing as well 
as covenant strictness. We estimate the following model: 
  
AISD = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * Switch  
                + d * PreviousCovenantViolation * Switch + e * LoanCharacteristics  
    + f * BorrowerCharacteristics + g * OtherControls + ε 
 
LCT is our dependent variables (ASID, Number of Covenants, Covenant Intensity, 
Contract Violation, and Days to Contract Violation). The results are reported in Table VII. 
 
[Table VII] 
 
Columns 1 and 2 repeat our earlier tests for comparison. In Column 3, we include both 
Switch and Previous Covenant Violation in the same model and add the interaction term in 
Column 4. Our earlier results still hold, that is both switching as well as having violated 
covenants in the previous loan increase loan spreads. The interaction term is insignificant. 
Overall, borrower who switch lenders after violating covenants pay approximately 40 bps higher 
loan spreads.  
 
Is there a differential effect for opaque borrowers? We use 3 opaqueness proxies to 
analyze this question. There are: (i) young which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if borrowers are 
less than 3 years listed on an exchange. (ii) Small is a dummy variable which is 1 if borrower‟s 
asset size falls into the 25% percentile of the distribution of our sample firms, and (iii) Not Rated 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm does not have an S&P long-term issuer rating. The 
results are reported in Columns 5 to 7.  
Column 5 shows that opaque (that is young) firms pay larger spreads consistent with prior 
literature (for example, Bharath et al. (2011) and Saunders and Steffen (2011)).
6
 However, we do 
not find that opaque firms pay significantly more after switching or after having violated 
compared to more transparent firms. 
 
                                                          
6
 We may find no significant effect for small borrowers because all firms in our sample are rather large, have their 
stock traded on an exchange and therefore are subject to the reporting requirements of public firms. 
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3.3.2 Switching, covenant violations and number of covenants 
We next analyze the effect of switching after covenant violations on the number of 
financial covenants (NUMCOV) in the next loan using a similar setup as above.  
 
NUMCOV = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * Switch  
                + d * PreviousCovenantViolation * Switch + e * LoanCharacteristics  
    + f * BorrowerCharacteristics + g * OtherControls + ε 
 
 
The results are reported in Table VIII. 
 
[Table VIII] 
 
Columns 1 and 2 repeat our earlier tests for comparison. Columns 3 and 4 of Table VIII 
show that switch does not have a significant effect on the number of covenants controlling for 
previous covenant violations. A covenant violation, however, substantially increases the number 
of covenants in the subsequent loan. Switching after having violated, on the other hand, does not 
have a significant effect. Interestingly, loans to young firms (Column 5) have fewer covenants 
after switching, but only if she has not violated a covenant before switching. In that case, we do 
not find any effect. As in our earlier tests, larger and investment grade rated firms have fewer 
covenants. 
Overall, lenders substantially increase the number of covenants in loans to borrowers that 
have violated covenants in the previous contract which is consistent with the interpretation that 
covenant violations are used as an early warning signal for a deterioration of a borrower‟s 
creditworthiness and lenders increase monitoring efforts making loan contracts stricter. 
Switching, however, does not have any effect on the number of covenants. 
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3.3.3 Switching, covenant violations and covenant intensity 
If lenders increase their monitoring effort, is this also reflected in the intensity of the 
covenants (COVINT)?  
 
COVINT = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * Switch  
                + d * PreviousCovenantViolation * Switch + e * LoanCharacteristics  
    + f * BorrowerCharacteristics + g * OtherControls + ε 
 
The results are reported in Table IX. 
 
[Table IX] 
 
Again, Columns 1 and 2 repeat our earlier tests for comparison. Consistent with higher 
monitoring effort of lenders, we find that covenant intensity is also increasing in the loan after a 
borrower has violated covenants. We find that switching lenders does not have an impact on 
covenant intensity either with or without having violated covenants before. Our opaqueness 
proxies do not show a differential effect for opaque relative to transparent firms.
7
  
 
Taken together, our tests show that covenant violations in the previous loan contract have 
substantial effects on the design of subsequent loan contracts. Violations increase borrowing 
costs, the number of financial covenants, and covenant intensity. Switching banks amplifies the 
effect on loan spreads but does not have a meaningful effect on covenants in subsequent loans. 
 
 
3.4 The Propensity to Violate Covenants 
Are borrowers more likely to violate covenants again after having violated financial 
covenants in the previous loan contract? Is the effect different for firms that switch after the 
                                                          
7
As we require all six indicator variables to be available for the calculation of the intensity index the total number of 
observations diminishes substantially compared to the whole sample. We can therefore not estimate the triple 
interaction term for young firms which already contain only a few observations as mentioned above. 
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violation? And, is there a differential effect for opaque firms? We analyze these questions using a 
similar regression model as above. 
 
Pr(VIOL) = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * Switch  
                + d * PreviousCovenantViolation * Switch + e * LoanCharacteristics  
    + f * BorrowerCharacteristics + g * OtherControls + ε 
 
Pr(VIOL) is an indicator that is 1 if the borrower violates at least 1 covenant in the new 
loan. The results are reported in Table X. 
 
[Table X] 
 
Borrowers who have violated covenants in the previous contract are 30% - 35% more 
likely to violate covenants in the subsequent loan contract. This effect is significant at the 1% 
level. We also find an effect for borrowers who switch lenders after a violation. The interaction 
term indicates a 21% lower likelihood to violate a covenant again. A possible interpretation is 
that new lenders invest more effort into due diligence and monitoring. Larger firms and 
investment grade rated firms are less likely to violate. We find weak evidence that opaque 
borrowers are more likely to violate again (after already having violated in the previous contract).  
 
 
 
 
 
Conditional on violating covenants in 2
nd
, 3
rd,…loan, when are covenants violated? More 
precisely, we focus on the time period between contract initiation date and covenant violation 
(DAYS). 
 
DAYS = a + b * PreviousCovenantViolation + c * Switch  
                + d * PreviousCovenantViolation * Switch + e * LoanCharacteristics  
    + f * BorrowerCharacteristics + g * OtherControls + ε 
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Table XI reports the results using a hazard rate model
8
. Note that a positive coefficient 
implies an earlier occurrence of covenant violations.  
 
[Table XI] 
 
We find only week evidence that borrowers who switch violate covenants earlier 
compared to firms who do not switch lenders. Borrowers who have violated covenants in the 
previous contract, however, also violate significantly earlier compare to other firms. This is 
consistent with covenant violations being an early warning signal of elevated borrower risk 
because these borrowers violate covenants in the subsequent loan contract more often and within 
a shorter time period. 
 
 
3.5 Covenant Violations and Default Rates 
If covenant violations provide an early warning signal about borrower health, is this also 
reflected in higher default rates? To examine this, we expand our data set with Chapter 11 filings 
obtained from the UCLA-LoPucki bankruptcy research database which ultimately collects its 
information from court files or SEC filings. We know the exact default date of each borrower and 
measure the predictive power of covenant violations via three different approaches.  
First, we follow our earlier analyses and investigate the impact of a covenant violation in 
the previous loan contract on the probability to default before the subsequent loan contract 
matures.  
Second, we construct a covenant violation dummy equal to 1 if the firm violates a 
covenant between 1,080 to 180 days before the default date. The contracts with covenant 
violations from 180 days prior to default until the default date are excluded due to a potentially 
increasing endogeneity of this variable when the default date approaches.  
Third, instead of focusing on the last contract before default, we use the entire universe of 
loan contracts of our sample borrowers and construct a variable Violation in Past Contracts which 
is equal to 1 if the borrower violated covenants in any of her previous loans (not necessarily the 
last one). Even though the quality of violations as early warning signal should be highest the 
                                                          
8
 All results are confirmed in OLS regressions. 
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closer the violation is to the default date, even violations in the past might have some predictive 
power. The results are reported in Table XII.  
 
[Table XII] 
 
Columns 1 to 4 follow our empirical setup described earlier. We find that covenant 
violations in the previous contract increase the likelihood to default. Borrowers who switch (with 
our without having violated covenants) are not more likely to default.  
Column 5 (Model 2) shows that covenant violations 1,080 to 180 days before the default 
date also substantially increase the probability of default. As mentioned above we exclude the last 
half year due to potential endogeneity.
9
  
Finally, model 3 shows that covenant violations in general contain information about 
borrower default probability. Is this information durable? We construct a new variable Ln(Days 
since Past Covenant Violation) which is the natural logarithm of the days between the last 
covenant violation and the last observable loan (before default) and interact it with the covenant 
violation variable. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. That is, having violated financial covenants in the past increases a borrower‟s default 
probability substantially, however, the default likelihood is significantly lower the more time 
passes since the covenant violation date.  
 
 
To analyze this further, we use keep everything fixed at the mean value of each variable 
and predict borrower default probability only varying the number of days from the most recent 
violation date until the start date of the current loan contract (after which the borrower either 
defaults or not) using Column 9. Figure 3 plots the predicted default probability against the days 
since the most recent contract violation. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
We add a straight line to show the predicted default probability of the average borrower 
which is 0.61% and much smaller compared to average default rate of 2.5% of our full sample. 
                                                          
9
 Note that the coefficient increases to 3.124, significant at the 1% level, if this time period is included. 
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There are two reasons for this: First, we use the predicted value which, second and more 
importantly, is derived on a subsample as we investigate only borrowers with at least two 
contracts and exclude contracts of all borrowers with no previous covenant violation.  
The borrower has a probability of default (PD) of 35.82% at the first day after a covenant 
violation. Figure 3 also shows that borrower PD is substantially higher in the period directly 
following the violation and decreases as a convex function over time. Borrowers exhibit a 
substantially higher likelihood to default especially in the first 100 days after a violation. Figure 3 
also supports our results in model 2 of Table XII because it shows a higher PD also until 3 years 
after a covenant was violated. The borrower PD takes more than 8 years (3,012 days) until it is 
close to the average level of 0.61% again. This is consistent with covenant violations being an 
indicator of elevated borrower risk. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of covenant violations on the design of loan contracts 
using a hand-collected data set of covenants in 5,411 loan facilities over the 1996 to 2010 period. 
Covenants are an important element of loan contracts and can be found in almost every private 
credit agreement.  
Overall, we provide empirical evidence that the violation of loan covenants provides an 
early warning signal of elevated borrower risk. We find that lenders respond to violations 
increasing loan spreads and the number of covenants. Furthermore, they increase the intensity of 
covenants. Borrowers who have already violated covenants are significantly more likely to 
default and to default earlier after loan origination. Consistently, we find that borrowers are more 
likely to file for Chapter 11, particularly in the first 100 days after they have violated covenants.  
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Figure 1 
The Effect of Past Covenant Violations on the All-in-Spread-Drawn 
 
The figure shows how the average All-in-Spread-Drawn evolves over the number of loans a borrower 
obtains from the same lender. It is split into whether a covenant was violated in the previous loan (1) or 
not (0). The number of loan observations is shown in parentheses. 
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Figure 2 
The Effect of Past Covenant Violations on the Number of Financial Covenants 
 
The figure shows how the average number of financial covenants evolves over the number of loans a 
borrower obtains from the same lender. It is split into whether a covenant was violated in the previous 
loan (1) or not (0). The number of loan observations is shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
Figure 3 
The Effect of Past Covenant Violations on the Borrower’s Probability of Default 
 
The figure shows the probability of default for the average borrower and for the borrower violating a 
covenant in the past. “Days since Past Contract Violation” denotes the number of days from the covenant 
violation in the past contract until the beginning of a new loan contract. 
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Table I   
Variable Definitions 
 
      
Variable Description Source 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES     
All-in-Spread-Drawn All-in-Spread-Drawn (in bps) is the coupon spread over LIBOR plus one time fees on 
the drawn portion of the loan. 
LPC Dealscan 
Number of Financial Covenants Number of financial covenants per contract. SEC Filings 
Covenant Intensity Index Index according to Bradley and Roberts (2004) ranging from 0 to 6. It is calculated as 
the sum of dummy variables for dividend restriction, asset-, equity-, debt sweep, 
secured, and 2 financial covenants or more. 
LPC Dealscan 
Contract Violation Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower violates at least one of the financial 
covenants in the loan agreement. 
Own Calculation 
Days to Contract Violation Days from contract initiation date until the first financial covenant violation. Own Calculation 
Default Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower defaults. UCLA Bankruptcy 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Loan Characteristics     
Switch Dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did 
not obtain a loan from the same lender over at least one year after the previous loan 
from this lender matured. 
LPC Dealscan, NIC 
Previous Covenant Violation Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower violated a covenant in the previous loan of 
our sample. 
Own Calculation 
Facility Size Facility amount of the loan in year 2000 $ million. LPC Dealscan 
Maturity (Months) Maturity of the loan in months. LPC Dealscan 
Secured Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured. LPC Dealscan 
Loan Purpose   
Corporate Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "General" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Recapitalization Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "Recapitalization" in the 
database. 
LPC Dealscan 
Acquisition Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "Acquisition" in the 
database. 
LPC Dealscan 
LBO Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "Leveraged Buy Out” in 
the database. 
LPC Dealscan 
Back Up Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "Back Up" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Other Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan issuance purpose is "Other" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Loan Type   
Revolver < 1 Year Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan type is "Revolver < 1 Year" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Revolver ≥ 1 Year Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan type is "Revolver ≥ 1 Year" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Bridge Loan Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan type is "Bridge Loan" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
364 - Day Facility Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan type is "364 - Day Facility" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Term Loan Dummy variable equal to one, if the loan type is "Term Loan" in the database. LPC Dealscan 
Borrower Characteristics     
Total Assets Total assets of the borrower in year 2000 $ million. Compustat 
Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to sales. Compustat 
Current Ratio Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Compustat 
Leverage Ratio Ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Compustat 
Coverage Ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses. Compustat 
Market to Book Ratio of the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity to book value of 
total assets. 
Compustat 
Borrower IPO (Years) Years since the IPO of the borrower. Compustat 
Rating   
Investment Grade Rating Dummy variable equal to one, if the borrower's S&P long-term issuer rating is BBB- or 
better. 
LPC Dealscan 
Non-Investment Grade Rating Dummy variable equal to one, if the borrower's S&P long-term issuer rating is BB+ or 
worse. 
LPC Dealscan 
Not Rated Dummy variable equal to one, if the borrower is not rated by S&P. LPC Dealscan 
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Table I continued   
Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Financial Covenant Types     
Debt Service Coverage Ratio EBITDA to Interest Expense and Principal Payment SEC Filings 
Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio EBITDA to Interest Expense, Principal Payment, Income Tax and Dividend on Preferred 
Stock 
SEC Filings 
Interest Coverage Ratio EBITDA to Interest Expense SEC Filings 
Debt to Capitalization Debt to Capitalization (Total Debt and Equity) SEC Filings 
Senior Debt to Capitalization Senior Debt to Capitalization (Total Debt and Equity) SEC Filings 
Debt to EBITDA Debt to EBITDA SEC Filings 
Senior Debt to EBITDA Senior Debt to EBITDA SEC Filings 
Debt to Net Worth Debt to Net Worth SEC Filings 
Senior Debt to Net Worth Senior Debt to Net Worth SEC Filings 
Current Ratio Current Assets to Current Liabilities SEC Filings 
Asset Coverage Ratio Current Assets to Liabilities SEC Filings 
Quick Ratio Current Assets minus Inventory to Current Liabilities SEC Filings 
Net Worth Net Worth SEC Filings 
Tangible Net Worth Tangible Net Worth SEC Filings 
EBITDA EBITDA SEC Filings 
Working Capital Current Assets minus Current Liabilities SEC Filings 
Cash and Cash Equivalents Cash and Cash Equivalents SEC Filings 
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics of loan and borrower characteristics for loans originated in the 1996 
to 2010 period. Borrower data is from the year prior to loan origination. Detailed definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table I. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  
 
              
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. P 5 Median P 95 
Panel A: Dependent Variables             
All-in-Spread-Drawn 5,315 183 124 30 162 400 
Number of Financial Covenants 5,163 2.55 1.16 1 2 4 
Covenant Intensity Index 1,985 4.55 1.66 1 5 6 
Contract Violation 5,163 55.0% 49.8% - - - 
Days to Contract Violation 3,023 427 397 96 288 1223 
Default 5,411 2.5% 15.7% - - - 
Panel B: Independent Variables             
B.1 Loan Characteristics       
   Switch 5,346 35.1% 47.7% - - - 
Previous Covenant Violation 2,971 57.2% 49.5% - - - 
Facility Size (Year 2000 USD mm) 5,411 298 415 11 151 1,139 
Maturity (Months) 5,349 48 22 12 57 84 
Secured 5,371 63.6% 48.1% - - - 
Loan Purpose in % of Firms 
      Corporate 5,411 45.7% 49.8% - - - 
Recapitalization 5,411 21.5% 41.1% - - - 
Acquisition 5,411 19.9% 39.9% - - - 
Back Up 5,411 6.5% 24.7% - - - 
Other 5,411 4.9% 21.6% - - - 
LBO 5,411 1.6% 12.4% - - - 
Loan Type in % of Firms 
      Revolver ≥ 1 Year 5,411 60.2% 49.0% - - - 
Term Loans 5,411 26.3% 44.0% - - - 
364 - Day Facility 5,411 9.1% 28.7% - - - 
Revolver < 1 Year 5,411 2.1% 14.2% - - - 
Bridge Loan 5,411 1.6% 12.6% - - - 
B.2 Borrower Characteristics             
Total Assets (Year 2000 USD mm) 5,409 3,291 6,667 65 854 17,155 
Profitability 5,376 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.46 
Current Ratio 5,333 1.84 1.12 0.58 1.59 3.83 
Leverage 5,401 0.33 0.22 0.007 0.30 0.73 
Coverage 5,241 15.44 40.75 0.39 4.48 66.67 
Market to Book 5,330 1.68 0.89 0.85 1.40 3.45 
Borrower IPO (Years) 4,476 45 46 1.61 12.96 104.96 
Credit Rating 
      Investment Grade Rating 5,411 24.1% 42.8% - - - 
Non-Investment Grade Rating 5,411 34.5% 47.5% - - - 
Not Rated 5,411 41.4% 49.3% - - - 
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Table III 
Descriptive Statistics by Covenant Violation in the Previous Loan Contract 
 
The table shows the mean and median of loan and borrower characteristics for granted loans in the time 
period 1996 to 2010 split into whether a covenant was violated in the previous loan (“Covenant 
Violation”) or no covenant violation (“No Covenant Violation”) occurred. The statistical significance of 
the difference between “Covenant Violation” and “No Covenant Violation” of the respective variable is 
tested via a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank sum test where the last two columns provide the corresponding t- 
and z-statistic. All variables are defined in Table I. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * 
= 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level.  
                  
 
No Violation 
 
Violation 
   
  (A) 
 
(B) 
 
(A) - (B) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median   t-statistics z-statistics 
Panel A: Dependent Variables                 
All-in-Spread-Drawn 131 100 
 
229 220 
 
-21.920*** -23.140*** 
Number of Financial Covenants 2.02 2 
 
2.62 3 
 
-15.030*** -14.600*** 
Covenant Intensity Index 4.57 5 
 
5.12 5 
 
-5.340*** -4.430*** 
Contract Violation 0.28 0 
 
0.70 1 
 
-24.630*** -22.340*** 
Days to Contract Violation 493 399 
 
414 206 
 
2.960*** 1.690* 
Default 0.008 0 
 
0.041 0 
 
-5.350*** -5.330*** 
Panel B: Independent Variables                 
B.1 Loan Characteristics 
        
Switch 0.20 0   0.28 0   -5.160*** -5.140*** 
Facility Size (Year 2000 USD mm) 428 252 
 
287 155 
 
8.670*** 10.600*** 
Maturity (Months) 44.0 50.0 
 
51.0 60.0 
 
-8.730*** -7.520*** 
Secured 0.40 0 
 
0.79 1 
 
-23.200*** -21.330*** 
Loan Purpose in % of Firms 
        
Corporate 0.61 1 
 
0.48 0 
 
7.340*** 7.270*** 
Recapitalization 0.10 0 
 
0.16 0 
 
-4.430*** -4.410*** 
Acquisition 0.09 0 
 
0.25 0 
 
-11.530*** -11.280*** 
Back Up 0.12 0 
 
0.02 0 
 
11.090*** 10.870*** 
Other 0.04 0 
 
0.05 0 
 
-1.64 -1.64 
LBO 0.02 0 
 
0.02 0 
 
-0.51 -0.51 
Loan Type in % of Firms 
        
Revolver ≥ 1 Year 0.64 1 
 
0.56 1 
 
4.380*** 4.360*** 
Term Loans 0.16 0 
 
0.36 0 
 
-11.680*** -11.430*** 
364 - Day Facility 0.15 0 
 
0.04 0 
 
9.910*** 9.750*** 
Revolver < 1 Year 0.02 0 
 
0.02 0 
 
0.48 0.48 
Bridge Loan 0.02 0 
 
0.02 0 
 
0.77 0.77 
B.2 Borrower Characteristics                 
Total Assets (Year 2000 USD mm) 5,737 2,161 
 
2,938 907 
 
10.510*** 13.530*** 
Profitability 0.18 0.16 
 
0.17 0.14 
 
1.920** 3.510*** 
Current Ratio 1.68 1.50 
 
1.71 1.53 
 
-0.98 -1.37 
Leverage 0.28 0.26 
 
0.38 0.37 
 
-13.470*** -13.800*** 
Coverage 17.96 6.68 
 
10.01 3.57 
 
6.460*** 15.550*** 
Market to Book 1.68 1.41 
 
1.57 1.33 
 
6.740*** 5.990*** 
Borrower IPO (Years) 50 17 
 
42 13 
 
4.640*** 6.240*** 
Credit Rating 
        
Investment Grade Rating 0.47 0 
 
0.13 0 
 
21.530*** 20.030*** 
Non-Investment Grade Rating 0.24 0 
 
0.53 1 
 
-16.850*** -16.100*** 
Not Rated 0.29 0   0.34 0   -2.290** -2.280** 
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Table IV  
The Effect of Repeated Borrowing on Loan Characteristics 
 
The tables show descriptive statistics of loan characteristics sorted by the number of loans. In Panel A the 
loan order is based on repeated borrowing from the same lender. In Panel B loans are sorted by repeated 
borrowing only irrespective of the lender. All variables are defined in Table I. 
 
Panel A: Repeated Borrowing from Same Lender     
Number 
Loans 
Number 
Facilities 
All-in-Spread-
Drawn 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Number of 
Covenants 
Contract 
Violation 
Financial 
Default 
1 3,441 193 4.43 2.66 0.57 0.024 
2 1,157 175 4.85 2.47 0.55 0.033 
3 506 159 5.07 2.31 0.49 0.025 
>= 4 307 153 4.86 1.98 0.43 0.013 
 
  
     Total 5,411 183 4.55 2.55 0.55 0.025 
       
       Panel B: Repeated Borrowing Only     
Number 
Loans 
Number 
Facilities 
All-in-Spread-
Drawn 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Number of 
Covenants 
Contract 
Violation 
Financial 
Default 
1 2,354 178 4.17 2.79 0.59 0.022 
2 1,422 193 4.90 2.55 0.57 0.030 
3 818 182 5.20 2.34 0.49 0.025 
>= 4 817 184 5.11 2.04 0.46 0.027 
 
  
     Total 5,411 183 4.55 2.55 0.55 0.025 
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Table V  
Covenant Violations and Loan Contract Terms 
 
The table reports results from multivariate regressions of different dependent variables. These are the (1) 
All-in-Spread-Drawn, (2) number of financial covenants, (3) covenant intensity, (4) contract violation and 
(5) days to contract violation. Previous covenant violation is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. All variables are described in Table I. 
In Model (3) “Secured” is excluded as it is part of the dependent variable. Standard errors shown in 
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of 
results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level.  
            
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable AISD 
Covenant 
Number 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Contract 
Violation 
Days to 
Contract 
Violation 
Regression Methodology OLS Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Logit OLS 
            
Previous Covenant Violation 21.899*** 0.403*** 0.418* 1.263*** -123.663*** 
 
(4.178) (0.108) (0.235) (0.156) (39.732) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
 Maturity (Months) -0.512*** 0.006* 0.017*** 0.006 4.092*** 
 
(0.172) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.953) 
Secured 56.309*** -0.029 
 
0.105 -24.042 
 
(5.798) (0.132) 
 
(0.183) (34.805) 
Log (Facility Size) -15.091*** 0.069 -0.163 0.146* -29.153 
 
(2.699) (0.056) (0.123) (0.080) (19.047) 
Borrower Characteristics 
     Profitability -0.719*** 0.006 0.009 0.001 1.040 
 
(0.246) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (1.258) 
Current Ratio -0.058** 0.001 -0.002* 0.000 -0.017 
 
(0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.160) 
Leverage 0.916*** -0.000 0.001 0.011** -0.503 
 
(0.147) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.777) 
Coverage -0.001* 0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.003 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Market to Book -0.127*** -0.000 -0.005*** -0.002** -0.123 
 
(0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.238) 
Log (Total Assets) -4.077 -0.421*** -0.233* -0.155* 12.694 
 
(2.943) (0.070) (0.136) (0.092) (16.856) 
Rating 
     Investment Grade Rating -46.196*** -0.929*** -0.827 -0.825*** -18.852 
 
(7.970) (0.197) (0.648) (0.226) (49.956) 
Not Rated -24.013*** -0.198 -0.539* -0.080 -38.623 
 
(7.299) (0.184) (0.294) (0.215) (43.520) 
Constant 440.607*** YES YES 1.160 297.734 
 
(39.989) 
  
(2.062) (222.270) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 2786 2709 848 1934 1039 
R2 0.634 0.143 0.172 0.225 0.191 
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Table VI  
Switching and Loan Contract Terms 
 
The table reports results from multivariate regressions of different dependent variables. These are the (1) 
All-in-Spread-Drawn, (2) number of financial covenants, (3) covenant intensity, (4) contract violation and 
(5) days to contract violation. Switch is a dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender 
or if the borrower did not obtain a loan from the same lender over at least one year after the previous loan 
from this lender matured. All variables are described in Table I. In Model (3) “Secured” is excluded as it 
is part of the dependent variable. Standard errors shown in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% 
level and *** = 1% level. 
            
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable AISD 
Covenant 
Number 
Covenant 
Intensity 
Contract 
Violation 
Days to 
Contract 
Violation 
Regression Methodology OLS Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Logit OLS 
            
Switch 11.997*** -0.148* 0.076 -0.108 -64.740*** 
 
(3.377) (0.089) (0.147) (0.108) (24.938) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
 Maturity (Months) -0.487*** 0.005* 0.011*** 0.007** 4.049*** 
 
(0.126) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.847) 
Secured 65.283*** 0.247** 
 
0.558*** -124.993*** 
 
(3.963) (0.097) 
 
(0.121) (33.605) 
Log (Facility Size) -14.626*** 0.078* -0.095 0.023 -21.804* 
 
(1.998) (0.046) (0.079) (0.055) (11.681) 
Borrower Characteristics 
     
Profitability -0.943*** 0.005 0.008 -0.004 1.196 
 
(0.181) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.875) 
Current Ratio -0.044** 0.001* -0.001* 0.001 -0.052 
 
(0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.106) 
Leverage 0.992*** -0.001 0.006 0.010*** -0.497 
 
(0.112) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.639) 
Coverage -0.001** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Market to Book -0.095*** -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 0.086 
 
(0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.141) 
Log (Total Assets) -3.128 -0.365*** -0.244** -0.087 15.819 
 
(2.252) (0.055) (0.096) (0.063) (12.767) 
Rating 
     
Investment Grade Rating -45.998*** -1.013*** -1.573*** -0.796*** -22.529 
 
(5.825) (0.151) (0.349) (0.174) (41.998) 
Not Rated -23.432*** -0.289** -0.448** -0.257* -16.751 
 
(5.379) (0.137) (0.189) (0.151) (34.349) 
Constant 508.284*** YES YES -1.388 166.705 
 
(43.617) 
  
(1.215) (164.543) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 4846 4732 1821 3934 2232 
R2 0.612 0.127 0.181 0.141 0.118 
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Table VII 
Covenant Violations, Switching and Loan Spreads 
 
The table reports results from OLS regressions relating the All-in-Spread-Drawn to Previous Covenant 
Violations and Switching. Previous covenant violation is a dummy variable equal to one if the borrower 
violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. Switch is a dummy variable equal to one for 
the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan from the same lender over at least 
one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. There are 3 proxies for borrower opacity: young 
(<3 years public), small (<25
th
 percentile total assets), and not rated firms (no S&P long-term issuer 
rating). All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in parentheses are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 
10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level.  
                
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Switch 11.997***   12.355** 15.904** 18.579*** 19.342*** 22.963*** 
 
(3.377) 
 
(4.920) (6.711) (7.011) (7.120) (7.888) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
21.899*** 22.666*** 23.986*** 25.195*** 22.636*** 11.443** 
  
(4.178) (4.128) (4.258) (4.435) (4.352) (5.258) 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
-5.649 -4.215 -12.181 -11.445 
  
 
 
(9.207) (9.686) (9.881) (10.920) 
                
Borrower Opacity 
    
Young Small Not Rated 
Opaque Firm 
    
31.631** 17.671 -41.425*** 
     
(12.455) (14.335) (8.062) 
Opaque Firm * Switch 
    
-19.890 -14.648 -24.032* 
     
(16.709) (24.804) (13.148) 
Opaque Firm * Previous Violation 
    
-4.658 13.873 33.587*** 
     
(16.512) (18.270) (9.261) 
Opaque Firm * Switch * Previous Violation 
    
-28.114 23.944 19.016 
          (24.707) (31.082) (19.192) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
  
 
Maturity (Months) -0.487*** -0.512*** -0.514*** -0.512*** -0.459*** -0.414** -0.505*** 
 
(0.126) (0.172) (0.174) (0.174) (0.175) (0.173) (0.173) 
Secured 65.283*** 56.309*** 56.180*** 56.287*** 60.080*** 61.256*** 55.160*** 
 
(3.963) (5.798) (5.571) (5.577) (5.385) (5.367) (5.496) 
Log (Facility Size) -14.626*** -15.091*** -14.929*** -14.963*** -14.644*** -13.995*** -14.872*** 
 
(1.998) (2.699) (2.730) (2.738) (2.720) (2.740) (2.720) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
   
 
 
Profitability -0.943*** -0.719*** -0.739*** -0.737*** -0.721*** -0.715*** -0.745*** 
 
(0.181) (0.246) (0.245) (0.245) (0.240) (0.236) (0.244) 
Current Ratio -0.044** -0.058** -0.055** -0.056** -0.057** -0.048* -0.053** 
 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Leverage 0.992*** 0.916*** 0.906*** 0.908*** 1.017*** 1.007*** 0.914*** 
 
(0.112) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.139) (0.140) (0.144) 
Coverage -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 
 
(3.2E-04) (4.9E-04) (4.9E-04) (4.9E-04) (0.001) (4.9E-04) (0.001) 
Market to Book -0.095*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.111*** -0.122*** 
 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log (Total Assets) -3.128 -4.077 -2.951 -2.981 0.662 5.346* -2.376 
 
(2.252) (2.943) (2.944) (2.946) (2.837) (2.891) (2.921) 
Rating 
 
 
   
  Investment Grade Rating -45.998*** -46.196*** -44.439*** -44.267*** -36.294*** -39.999*** -51.798*** 
 
(5.825) (7.970) (7.854) (7.842) (6.842) (7.122) (7.958) 
Not Rated -23.432*** -24.013*** -22.246*** -22.181*** 
  
 
 
(5.379) (7.299) (7.025) (7.022) 
  
 Constant 508.284*** 440.607*** 401.601*** 401.204*** 332.208*** 292.059*** 407.542*** 
 
(43.617) (39.989) (39.047) (39.072) (36.461) (39.925) (39.544) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 4846 2786 2740 2740 2740 2740 2740 
R2 0.612 0.634 0.640 0.641 0.640 0.642 0.645 
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Table VIII  
Covenant Violations, Switching and the Number of Financial Covenants 
 
The table reports results from ordered logit regressions relating the number of financial covenants to 
Previous Covenant Violations and Switching. Previous covenant violation is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. Switch is a dummy 
variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan from the 
same lender over at least one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. There are 3 proxies for 
borrower opacity: young (<3 years public), small (<25
th
 percentile total assets), and not rated firms (no 
S&P long-term issuer rating). All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in parentheses 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of results is 
indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level. 
                
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Switch -0.148*   -0.216 -0.260 -0.167 -0.166 -0.183 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.132) (0.158) (0.160) (0.161) (0.180) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
0.403*** 0.430*** 0.415*** 0.453*** 0.409*** 0.496*** 
  
(0.108) (0.107) (0.120) (0.121) (0.125) (0.152) 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
0.070 -0.022 0.142 0.068 
  
 
 
(0.226) (0.229) (0.242) (0.266) 
                
Borrower Opacity 
    
Young Small Not Rated 
Opaque Firm 
    
0.418 -0.063 -0.043 
     
(0.335) (0.337) (0.234) 
Opaque Firm * Switch 
    
-2.706*** -0.550 -0.227 
     
(0.745) (0.540) (0.361) 
Opaque Firm * Previous Violation 
    
-0.416 0.048 -0.208 
     
(0.621) (0.423) (0.254) 
Opaque Firm * Switch * Previous Violation 
    
2.856** -0.113 0.025 
          (1.128) (0.685) (0.502) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
  
 
Maturity (Months) 0.005* 0.006* 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Secured 0.247** -0.029 -0.040 -0.041 -0.002 0.007 -0.029 
 
(0.097) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.130) (0.130) (0.133) 
Log (Facility Size) 0.078* 0.069 0.071 0.071 0.077 0.073 0.068 
 
(0.046) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
  
 
  
Profitability 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Current Ratio 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(4.4E-04) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.001 -9.53E-06 2.42E-04 2.20E-04 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Coverage -9.12E-06 8.36E-06 1.07E-05 1.08E-05 7.19E-06 7.75E-06 1.07E-05 
 
(7.6E-06) (1.4E-05) (1.4E-05) (1.4E-05) (1.4E-05) (1.4E-05) (1.4E-05) 
Market to Book -7.62E-04 -3.50E-04 -4.40E-04 -4.45E-04 -4.64E-04 -5.61E-04 -4.86E-04 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.365*** -0.421*** -0.435*** -0.434*** -0.402*** -0.446*** -0.438*** 
 
(0.055) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.077) (0.072) 
Rating 
 
 
  
 
 
 Investment Grade Rating -1.013*** -0.929*** -0.941*** -0.943*** -0.852*** -0.827*** -0.886*** 
 
(0.151) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199) (0.179) (0.178) (0.204) 
Not Rated -0.289** -0.198 -0.227 -0.229 
 
 
 
 
(0.137) (0.184) (0.185) (0.185) 
 
 
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 4732 2709 2665 2665 2665 2665 2665 
R2 0.127 0.143 0.145 0.145 0.146 0.146 0.145 
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Table IX  
Covenant Violations, Switching and Covenant Intensity 
 
The table reports results from ordered logit regressions relating Bradley and Roberts (2004) covenant 
intensity index to Previous Covenant Violations and Switching. Previous covenant violation is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. Switch is 
a dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan 
from the same lender over at least one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. There are 3 
proxies for borrower opacity: young (<3 years public), small (<25
th
 percentile total assets), and not rated 
firms (no S&P long-term issuer rating). All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in 
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of 
results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level. 
                
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Switch 0.076   0.181 0.632 0.642 0.830 1.418** 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.260) (0.445) (0.470) (0.533) (0.581) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
0.418* 0.441* 0.582** 0.631** 0.857*** 1.123*** 
  
(0.235) (0.239) (0.276) (0.291) (0.280) (0.346) 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
-0.575 -0.628 -1.011 -1.825*** 
  
 
 
(0.526) (0.547) (0.633) (0.666) 
                
Borrower Opacity 
    
Young Small Not Rated 
Opaque Firm 
    
0.140 0.473 0.336 
     
(0.628) (0.958) (0.514) 
Opaque Firm * Switch 
    
0.992 -1.175 -2.076*** 
     
(0.938) (1.224) (0.778) 
Opaque Firm * Previous Violation 
    
-0.667 -1.631 -1.460** 
     
(0.827) (1.013) (0.568) 
Opaque Firm * Switch * Previous Violation 
     
2.352* 3.497*** 
            (1.389) (0.947) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
  
 
Maturity (Months) 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Log (Facility Size) -0.095 -0.163 -0.148 -0.148 -0.151 -0.177 -0.125 
 
(0.079) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.129) (0.120) (0.126) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
     
Profitability 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Current Ratio -0.001* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.006 0.001 1.01E-04 -3.13E-05 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Coverage -3.48E-05* 1.17E-04** 1.10E-04** 1.15E-04** 1.06E-04** 1.15E-04** 1.07E-04** 
 
(2.1E-05) (5.3E-05) (5.3E-05) (5.2E-05) (5.1E-05) (5.3E-05) (5.2E-05) 
Market to Book -0.002* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.244** -0.233* -0.222 -0.230 -0.120 -0.269 -0.263* 
 
(0.096) (0.136) (0.144) (0.143) (0.129) (0.166) (0.144) 
Rating 
 
 
    
 Investment Grade Rating -1.573*** -0.827 -0.887 -0.886 -0.806 -0.651 -0.918 
 
(0.349) (0.648) (0.670) (0.668) (0.688) (0.696) (0.663) 
Not Rated -0.448** -0.539* -0.579* -0.596** 
  
 
 
(0.189) (0.294) (0.297) (0.301) 
  
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 1821 848 826 826 826 826 826 
R2 0.181 0.172 0.173 0.174 0.172 0.178 0.184 
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Table X  
Covenant Violations, Switching and the Propensity for Subsequent Violations 
 
The table reports results from logit regressions relating the propensity for covenant violations in the 
current contract to Previous Covenant Violations and Switching. Previous covenant violation is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. Switch is 
a dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan 
from the same lender over at least one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. There are 3 
proxies for borrower opacity: young (<3 years public), small (<25
th
 percentile total assets), and not rated 
firms (no S&P long-term issuer rating). All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in 
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of 
results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level. 
 
                
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Switch -0.108   -0.225 0.343 0.328 0.225 0.182 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.180) (0.255) (0.258) (0.290) (0.346) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
1.263*** 1.271*** 1.471*** 1.348*** 1.491*** 1.625*** 
  
(0.156) (0.159) (0.181) (0.185) (0.192) (0.231) 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
-0.851*** -0.796** -0.744** -0.727* 
  
 
 
(0.327) (0.333) (0.366) (0.433) 
                
Borrower Opacity 
    
Young Small Not Rated 
Opaque Firm 
    
-0.629 0.490 0.090 
     
(0.571) (0.467) (0.319) 
Opaque Firm * Switch 
    
-0.802 0.414 0.325 
     
(1.147) (0.734) (0.526) 
Opaque Firm * Previous Violation 
    
1.585** -0.223 -0.376 
     
(0.733) (0.523) (0.360) 
Opaque Firm * Switch * Previous Violation 
    
0.256 -0.232 -0.213 
          (1.355) (0.902) (0.676) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
  
 
Maturity (Months) 0.007** 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Secured 0.558*** 0.105 0.129 0.129 0.153 0.135 0.126 
 
(0.121) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182) (0.179) (0.181) (0.181) 
Log (Facility Size) 0.023 0.146* 0.144* 0.143* 0.140* 0.151* 0.143* 
 
(0.055) (0.080) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
  
 
  
Profitability -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Current Ratio 0.001 2.65E-04 3.45E-04 3.86E-04 4.73E-04 4.32E-04 3.29E-04 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.010*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Coverage -1.63E-05 -1.11E-05 -1.01E-05 -1.25E-05 -1.07E-05 -1.30E-05 -1.41E-05 
 
(1.2E-05) (2.6E-05) (2.6E-05) (2.6E-05) (2.6E-05) (2.5E-05) (2.6E-05) 
Market to Book -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.087 -0.155* -0.172* -0.177* -0.134 -0.079 -0.189** 
 
(0.063) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.086) (0.101) (0.095) 
Rating 
 
 
  
 
 
 Investment Grade Rating -0.796*** -0.825*** -0.762*** -0.759*** -0.748*** -0.777*** -0.705*** 
 
(0.174) (0.226) (0.226) (0.224) (0.212) (0.216) (0.231) 
Not Rated -0.257* -0.080 -0.095 -0.097 
  
 
 
(0.151) (0.215) (0.219) (0.218) 
  
 Constant -1.388 1.160 0.787 0.661 0.351 -0.498 0.712 
 
(1.215) (2.062) (1.567) (1.546) (1.403) (1.555) (1.548) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 3934 1934 1916 1916 1916 1916 1916 
R2 0.141 0.225 0.226 0.230 0.235 0.233 0.232 
39 
 
  
Table XI  
Covenant Violations, Switching and the Days to Subsequent Violations 
 
The table reports results from hazard rate model regressions relating days to covenant violation in the 
current contract to Previous Covenant Violations and Switching. Previous Covenant Violation is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan contract. Switch is 
a dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan 
from the same lender over at least one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. There are 3 
proxies for borrower opacity: young (<3 years public), small (<25
th
 percentile total assets), and not rated 
firms (no S&P long-term issuer rating). All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in 
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of 
results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 5% level and *** = 1% level. 
 
  
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Switch 0.157**   0.228** 0.100 -0.015 -0.069 -0.210 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.103) (0.180) (0.182) (0.195) (0.228) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
0.347*** 0.369*** 0.322*** 0.236** 0.346*** 0.345** 
  
(0.096) (0.097) (0.111) (0.112) (0.127) (0.160) 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
0.166 0.212 0.254 0.330 
  
 
 
(0.220) (0.223) (0.244) (0.286) 
                
Borrower Opacity 
    
Young Small Not Rated 
Opaque Firm 
    
-0.903* 0.068 0.079 
     
(0.494) (0.272) (0.244) 
Opaque Firm * Switch 
    
0.975* 0.474 0.657* 
     
(0.591) (0.455) (0.355) 
Opaque Firm * Previous Violation 
    
0.797 -0.167 -0.071 
     
(0.542) (0.313) (0.245) 
Opaque Firm * Switch * Previous Violation 
    
-0.571 -0.241 -0.272 
          (0.645) (0.535) (0.443) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
  
  
 
Maturity (Months) -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Secured 0.278*** 0.039 -0.008 -0.008 -0.024 -0.043 -0.041 
 
(0.084) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.119) (0.124) 
Log (Facility Size) 0.042 0.065 0.058 0.056 0.048 0.051 0.055 
 
(0.031) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
  
 
  
Profitability -0.005* -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.009** -0.007* -0.008** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Current Ratio 5.43E-05 1.02E-04 8.95E-05 8.27E-05 8.63E-05 1.06E-04 2.96E-05 
 
(3.2E-04) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.002 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.004* 0.005* 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Coverage 3.41E-09 -8.95E-06 -9.63E-06 -9.77E-06 -4.51E-06 -8.82E-06 -8.69E-06 
 
(8.1E-06) (1.1E-05) (1.1E-05) (1.1E-05) (1.2E-05) (1.2E-05) (1.1E-05) 
Market to Book 9.77E-05 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(3.5E-04) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Total Assets) -0.027 -0.022 0.001 0.002 -0.023 -0.025 -0.003 
 
(0.037) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.049) (0.057) (0.056) 
Rating 
 
 
  
 
 
 Investment Grade Rating 0.057 0.072 0.069 0.063 -0.013 0.013 0.032 
 
(0.113) (0.170) (0.177) (0.179) (0.166) (0.171) (0.185) 
Not Rated 0.078 0.130 0.163 0.161 
  
 
 
(0.090) (0.128) (0.135) (0.135) 
  
 Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Type Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 2232 1039 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 
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Table XII  
The Impact of Previous Covenant Violation on a Borrower’s Likelihood to Default 
 
The table reports results from logit regressions relating borrower default to Previous Covenant Violations and Switching. We use three different 
models. In Model 1, previous covenant violation is a dummy variable equal to one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the previous loan 
contract. Switch is a dummy variable equal to one for the first loan from this lender or if the borrower did not obtain a loan from the same lender over 
at least one year after the previous loan from this lender matured. In Model 2, “Covenant Violation in [-1,080; -180] Days prior to Default” is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the borrower violated a financial covenant in the time period from 1,080 to 180 days prior to default. In Model 3, 
“Violation in Past Contract” is one when the borrower violated a financial covenant in the respective past loan. “Ln[Days since Past Contract 
(Covenant Violation)]” is the natural logarithm of the number of days from the end of the respective past loan contract until the current loan under 
investigation if no financial covenant was violated.“Number of Loans with No Cov. Violation” is the number of loans without a financial covenant 
violation between the respective past loan and the current loan under investigation. All variables are described in Table I. Standard errors shown in 
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10% level, ** = 
5% level and *** = 1% level. 
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Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Switch 0.130 
 
0.574 1.966 
 
 
 
0.322 
 
0.936 0.891 
 
(0.340) 
 
(0.523) (1.655) 
 
 
 
(0.388) 
 
(0.896) (0.903) 
Previous Covenant Violation 
 
1.975** 1.965** 2.473** 
 
 
  
  
 
  
(0.949) (0.957) (1.255) 
 
 
  
  
 
Switch * Previous Covenant Violation 
 
 
 
-1.510 
 
 
  
  
 
        (1.803)               
Covenant Violation in [-1,080; -180] Days prior to Default 
 
 
   
2.951*** 
  
  
 
            (0.788)           
Violation in Past Contract 
 
 
   
 
  
26.383*** 26.551*** 29.757*** 
  
 
   
 
  
(6.991) (6.632) (8.738) 
Ln[Days since Past Contract ( Covenant Violation)] 
 
 
      
3.036*** 3.088*** 3.615*** 
  
 
      
(0.909) (0.854) (1.154) 
Violation in Past Contract * Ln[Days since Past Contract 
(Covenant Violation)] 
 
 
      
-3.811*** -3.828*** -4.297*** 
 
 
      
(0.944) (0.914) (1.207) 
Number of Loans with No Cov. Violation in Between 
 
 
      
  
-1.216 
                      (1.540) 
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
      
  
 
Maturity (Months) 0.026*** 0.030 0.029 0.030 
 
-0.008 
 
0.035*** 0.032 0.031 0.031 
 
(0.009) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) 
Secured 1.957*** 1.765** 1.813** 1.799** 
 
1.013** 
 
2.278*** 2.027 2.071 2.050 
 
(0.495) (0.807) (0.848) (0.858) 
 
(0.470) 
 
(0.571) (1.243) (1.275) (1.301) 
Log (Facility Size) 0.408** -0.004 0.047 0.041 
 
0.476** 
 
0.518** 0.436 0.586 0.553 
 
(0.185) (0.236) (0.241) (0.241) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.238) (0.533) (0.568) (0.535) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
      
  
 
Profitability -0.026 0.013 0.012 0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.022 0.045 0.039 0.048 
 
(0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.018) (0.031) (0.027) (0.036) 
Current Ratio 0.005*** 1.31E-04 4.23E-04 3.03E-04 
 
0.002 
 
0.005*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Leverage 0.016 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.016 0.044 0.052 0.051 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.012) (0.033) (0.036) (0.038) 
Coverage 
     
0.013 
 
-8.08E-05 1.78E-04 7.99E-05 1.06E-04 
      
(0.012) 
 
(9.8E-05) (1.7E-04) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market to Book -0.005* -0.027** -0.025** -0.025** 
 
-0.007** 
 
-0.006 -0.037*** -0.034** -0.034** 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.372 0.501 0.593 0.568 
 
0.226 
 
0.217 -0.295 -0.211 -0.114 
 
(0.273) (0.351) (0.392) (0.394) 
 
(0.289) 
 
(0.301) (0.536) (0.539) (0.494) 
Rating 
 
 
      
  
 
Investment Grade Rating -0.778 -1.159 -1.243 -1.219 
 
-1.724* 
 
-0.493 -1.003 -1.542 -1.442 
 
(0.498) (0.930) (0.955) (0.966) 
 
(0.880) 
 
(0.596) (0.868) (1.134) (1.156) 
Not Rated -0.629 -3.648*** -3.433*** -3.486*** 
 
-0.540 
 
-0.750* 
  
 
 
(0.397) (1.120) (1.092) (1.115) 
 
(0.509) 
 
(0.404) 
  
 
Constant -10.007*** -5.484* -7.712** -8.036** 
 
-8.142*** 
 
-10.458*** -25.025*** -27.209*** -31.646*** 
 
(2.186) (2.928) (3.382) (3.363) 
 
(2.706) 
 
(2.506) (8.856) (8.616) (10.262) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 4062 1633 1618 1618 
 
3919 
 
5273 707 691 679 
R2 0.259 0.407 0.414 0.416   0.279   0.291 0.391 0.416 0.423 
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Appendix I 
 
SECTION 7.10. Certain Financial Covenants. 
(a) Debt Ratio. The Borrower will not permit the Debt Ratio to exceed the following 
respective ratios at any time during the following respective periods: 
Period 
---------------------- 
From the date hereof 
through August 31, 2000 
 
From September 1, 2000 
through August 31, 2001 
 
From September 1, 2001 
 
and at all times thereafter 
Ratio 
---------- 
 
4.75 to 1 
 
4.50 to 1 
 
 
4.25 to 1 
 
4.00 to 1 
 
 
(b) Senior Debt Ratio. The Borrower will not permit the Senior Debt Ratio to exceed the 
following respective ratios at any time during the following respective periods: 
Period 
---------------------- 
From the date hereof 
through February 29, 2000 
 
From March 1, 2000 
through August 31, 2000 
 
From September 1, 2000 
 
and at all times thereafter 
Ratio 
---------- 
 
3.75 to 1 
 
3.50 to 1 
 
 
3.00 to 1 
 
2.50 to 1 
 
 
(c) Interest Coverage Ratio. The Borrower will not permit the Interest Coverage Ratio to 
be less than the following respective ratios at any time during the following respective 
periods: 
Period 
---------------------- 
From the date hereof 
through August 31, 2000 
 
From September 1, 2000 
through August 31, 2001 
 
From September 1, 2001 
 
and at all times thereafter 
Ratio 
---------- 
 
2.25 to 1 
 
2.00 to 1 
 
 
1.75 to 1 
 
1.50 to 1 
 
(d) Fixed-charges Ratio. The Borrower will not permit the 
Fixed-charges Ratio to be less than 1.00 to 1 as at the last day of any fiscal quarter of each 
fiscal year. 
